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Abstract: It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to 
cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual 
advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The pre-
sent paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how 
to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in 
social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the 
second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedural-
ly just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and 
related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series 
of objections are considered and responded to. 
 
 
1. Instilling Virtue, Avoiding Bias 
What is the purpose of education? I will follow Alvin Goldman in taking it that ‘[t]he 
fundamental goal of education, like that of science, is the promotion of knowledge.’1 
Before considering what it is for something to be a fundamental goal of education, it 
should be noted that Goldman is here working with a conception of knowledge that 
equates knowledge with true belief.
2
 In other words, taking knowledge to constitute a 
goal of education is to take true belief to constitute a goal of education. This being a 
goal of education makes sense of the fact that educators typically strive to make sure 
that any material presented to students is factually correct (consider controversies re-
garding teaching creationism) as well as clear and easy to understand and as such not 
                                                 
1
 Goldman (1999: 349). 
2
 See Goldman (1999: 5). 
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likely to lead to misunderstandings (consider the use of textbooks as opposed to 
sometimes esoteric primary sources, particularly early in the educational process).  
There might be other goals of education beside that of knowledge, of course. For 
one thing, there are arguably a number of non-epistemic goals relevant to education. 
Prominent candidates include those of enabling students to embark on a successful 
career, to be morally decent human beings, as well to participate in the democratic 
process. At the same time, it seems that the epistemic goal of attaining knowledge is 
still paramount, at least in the following sense: Attaining knowledge is conducive to, 
if not necessary for, attaining non-epistemic goals like those just mentioned. For ex-
ample, it will arguably be hard for students to have a successful career if they don’t 
know a substantial amount of things. Moreover, doing the morally right thing requires 
having an at least largely accurate picture of the world, since good intentions will do 
us little good, and might even make for great harm, if combined with a mistaken view 
about one’s situation and the likely consequences of one’s options. And, finally, mak-
ing wise political choices, be it directly or by electing representatives, requires accu-
rate information about the relevant candidates, the functioning of society, and about 
what means are conducive to what political goals. 
That the epistemic goal of knowledge is paramount in relation to non-epistemic 
goals, in the sense just outlined, does not imply that it is unique in that respect. For 
one thing, there might be other epistemic goals, beside knowledge. Plausible candi-
dates include understanding and wisdom. However, as I have argued elsewhere, we 
have good reason to believe that knowledge, in the sense of true belief, is the only ep-
istemic goal.
3
 For that reason, I will henceforth assume that (a) knowledge, thus un-
derstood, is the only epistemic goal of education, since the only epistemic goal, and 
(b) the goal of knowledge is paramount compared to any non-epistemic goals of edu-
cation, for the reasons provided in the previous paragraph. That the goal of knowledge 
thereby is both unique in the epistemic realm and paramount compared to other non-
epistemic goals of education is what warrants saying that the goal of knowledge is the 
fundamental goal of education, as Goldman puts it.
4
 
                                                 
3
 See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a). 
4
 Notice that it doesn’t follow from the claim that knowledge is the fundamental goal of education that 
educators should be imparting just any pieces of knowledge to their students, including knowledge of 
completely trivial matters. As we have seen, knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, partly on 
account of the fact that knowledge—in the sense of true belief—is unique in being an epistemic goal. 
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If knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, we have reason to instill epis-
temic virtues in students. This follows in so far as there is a legitimate consequential-
ist notion of virtue, on which virtues are simply dispositions conducive to achieving 
goals. Within moral philosophy, this is the notion of virtue that we find in John Stuart 
Mill’s Utilitarianism.5 For Mill, moral virtues are dispositions that promote moral 
ends. In that respect, Mill is not a virtue ethicist, but he has a virtue theory. That is, he 
doesn’t define the good in terms of virtue, but the other way around.6 As he puts it, 
‘actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than vir-
tue’.7 For Mill, who is a hedonist, the end in question is happiness.  
Two things should be noted. First, a consequentialist about moral virtue does not 
need to deny that virtues can be accompanied by certain motivations. For example, for 
Aristotle, it would be a motivation to do the virtuous thing for the sake of the noble. 
Someone accepting Mill’s virtue theory also does not need to deny that virtues tend to 
be acquired in certain ways (if indeed they are), e.g., through experience. What Mill 
and other consequentialists about virtue would deny is simply that these things are 
necessary for possessing virtue.
 
All that is required for virtue possession is the rele-
vant disposition being such that it promotes happiness. 
Second, Mill also does not deny that there are cases in which we value moral vir-
tue in itself. To the contrary, utilitarians, according to Mill, ‘not only place virtue at 
the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also 
                                                                                                                                           
While knowledge being unique in constituting such a goal entails that only instances of knowledge are 
of epistemic non-instrumental value, it does not follow that all instances of knowledge are valuable 
thus. It might, for example, be that only significant instances of knowledge are non-instrumentally val-
uable. See Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm (2013) for an argument to this effect. 
5
 See Mill (2001/1861). A similar notion can be found in Driver (2001). Others have connected virtue 
with utility in a less direct manner than Mill and Driver do. For example, Hume (1975/1777) maintains 
that ‘[i]t is the nature and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable or 
approved of by every one who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure, be-
cause they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it more 
immediately’ (261, fn. 1; emphasis in original). Sidgwick (1884) suggests that ‘it is primarily the voli-
tions to produce certain particular effects which we regard as grounds for attributing virtue’ (224-5), 
although he finds it ‘difficult to say how far an act which is concerned by the agent to be good but 
which is really bad can ever be judged to be virtuous’ (224). 
6
 See Driver (2001). 
7
 Mill (2001/1861: 36). 
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recognize as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good 
in itself, without looking to any end beyond it’.8 However, here as elsewhere, we must 
distinguish between valuing something for its own sake, and something being valua-
ble for its own sake—and, on Mill’s utilitarianism, only happiness is valuable for its 
own sake.
9
 
Taking Mill’s theory of moral virtue as our model, we may develop a consequen-
tialist theory of epistemic virtue. More specifically, we may take epistemic virtue—or 
at least a kind of epistemic virtue, in so far as we want to be pluralists with respect to 
notions of epistemic virtue
10—to consist in a disposition that promotes epistemic 
goals, including that of knowledge.
11
 This is what justifies the claim made earlier, to 
the effect that, if attaining knowledge is a fundamental goal of education, educators 
have reason to instill epistemic virtue in students, the reason being that (consequen-
tialist) epistemic virtue consists exactly in a disposition to promote that goal. 
 However, one common obstacle to virtue is cognitive bias, i.e., systematic and 
predictable tendencies for inaccurate judgment. Cognitive bias constitutes an obstacle 
to virtue by reducing one’s reliability, and making it harder to avoid false belief and 
thereby also to attain knowledge. Consequently, given the prevalence of cognitive bi-
as, attaining virtue is often going to require avoiding bias. From this it follows that, if 
we have reason to instill epistemic virtue in students, for the reasons presented above, 
                                                 
8
 Mill (2001/1861: 36; emphasis added). 
9
 However, see fn. 11. 
10
 After all, even virtue epistemologists defending non-consequentialist notions of epistemic virtue tend 
to accept that there also is a consequentialist notion of epistemic virtue. See, e.g., Baehr (2011: 135), as 
well as Battaly (2012) on the virtues attaching to what she refers to as ‘low-grade’ knowledge. 
11
 Note that Mill eventually makes a move that doesn’t translate to the epistemic case: ‘Virtue, accord-
ing to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end [of happiness], but it is ca-
pable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and 
cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness’ (2001/1861: 37). That is, we 
might start to derive happiness from exercising virtue. That is not to say that virtue is (or becomes) 
intrinsically valuable—only happiness is, and it is virtue leading to happiness that makes it valuable. It 
is, however, to say that each instance of virtue may bring happiness, and as such come to have instru-
mental value. The same does not happen with epistemic virtue, because it is not a psychological atti-
tude of the subject that determines its value. What determines its value is it leading to knowledge. As 
such it might in the case of epistemic virtue be a good thing that we desire such virtue for its own sake, 
in so far as that’s conducive to coming to know, but it does not follow that virtue in any relevant sense 
thereby becomes part of the sole bearer of intrinsic epistemic value, i.e., knowledge. 
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then we also have reason to teach students how to avoid bias, since such bias consti-
tutes a common obstacle to achieving epistemic virtue. 
This brings us to the topic of the present paper, which concerns a problem that 
presents itself for educators attempting to teach students how to avoid bias for pur-
poses of instilling epistemic virtue: we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to bias 
on account of overconfidence, and thereby fail to listen to advice aimed at reducing 
bias (Section 2). This is the problem of intellectual deference. It will be argued that 
recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this 
problem in two steps (Section 3), the second of which involves educators communi-
cating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the 
relevant form of procedural justices will be specified (Sections 4) as well as related to 
Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice (Section 5). Finally, 
a series of objections will be considered and responded to (Section 6). 
 
2. Overconfidence and the Problem of Intellectual Deference 
If what was argued in the previous section is on the right track, educators have reason 
to instill epistemic virtue in students, and a derivative but substantive reason to teach 
students how to avoid cognitive bias. However, as mentioned already in the above, 
when thinking about how to go about doing the latter, we encounter a problem. In this 
section, it will be argued that the relevant problem can be understood as a problem of 
deference, and of intellectual deference in particular. But before spelling out the prob-
lem, we need to say something about what constitutes deference. 
When we defer to someone, two things happen: we listen to that someone, and 
believe what they are saying because they are saying it.
12
 For present purposes, to lis-
ten is simply to attend to someone’s speech and process the content of what they are 
saying. As such, there is an act component to listening (attending to), as well as a 
more or less automatic result of performing such acts (processing content). In a mo-
                                                 
12
 To say that someone believes what someone else is saying because they’re saying it is to make a 
mere causal claim, and not to prejudge the issue of the believer’s epistemic reasons for the relevant 
belief. The latter are relevant to whether or not the believer can be said to be justified on the basis of 
deference, which is not something that I will take a stand on here. However, if there’s a sense of 
‘knowledge’ that has knowledge come out identical to true belief, knowledge (in that sense) does not 
require justification or reasons, and believing that p as a causal consequence of being told that p 
amounts to knowledge in so far as p is true. 
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ment, we shall discuss some empirical assumptions regarding the relation between 
listening and believing what one is being told. For now, it suffices to note that there is 
no conceptual connection between the two. More specifically, listening to someone 
does not necessarily entail taking on board what one is being told, or being particular-
ly prone to change one’s mind in case one believes something to the contrary. Listen-
ing is certainly compatible with both (i.e., believing and a willingness to change one’s 
mind), but entails neither as a matter of conceptual necessity.  
Again, to defer to someone is to listen to them and believe what they are saying 
because they are saying it. I will make a simple but potentially controversial, norma-
tive assumption about when we should defer, as follows: knowledge being the epis-
temic goal, we should defer to those who know what they are talking about.
13
 To 
know what one is talking about, in the sense employed in so far as we follow Gold-
man, is to speak the truth.
14
 Taking someone speaking the truth to constitute a suffi-
cient condition for it being the case that the hearer should defer to her might be taken 
to raise worries about blind deference, i.e., cases wherein a hearer should defer to a 
speaker, on account of her speaking the truth, without the hearer knowing anything 
about the speaker’s epistemic credentials. As I have defended the idea that there is 
nothing epistemically objectionable about such blind deference elsewhere, I will not 
pursue that possibility here.
15
 
                                                 
13
 See Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) for a defense of an idea along these lines. Notice, however, 
that Hawthorne and Srinivasan, unlike Goldman (1999), do not equate knowledge with true belief, alt-
hough they suggest that much of what they say would apply to such a notion as well (see Hawthorne 
and Srinivasan, 2013: 13). 
14
 Notice that this disqualifies people who believe truly but provide insincere reports from being said to 
know what they are talking about, while it qualifies people who do not believe what they are saying but 
nevertheless speak the truth—consider, e.g., Lackey’s (2008) creationist teacher—as knowing what 
they are talking about. 
15
 See Ahlstrom-Vij (manuscript). Of course, from a first-person perspective, it is seldom going to be 
transparent to me what patterns of deference will have me come to know things. Indeed, in some cases, 
my evidence might even lead me astray. That is unfortunate, but does not change the fact of the matter: 
if a source knows what she is talking about, what I should do is defer, whether or not that seems right 
to me in light of my misleading evidence. One way to bolster this claim is by considering what I would 
be inclined to say if, after the fact, I find out that, contrary to what my evidence suggested, the person 
did in fact know what she was talking about. In that case, I would say ‘I should’ve listened.’ (I am 
grateful to Sandy Goldberg for this suggestion.) That is the fact I am trying to account for—what we 
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Those who still find the assumption that we should defer to those who know what 
they are talking about implausible may note the following: the main upshot of the fol-
lowing sections is that we have good empirical reason to believe that there are certain 
things that sources may do for purposes of making it likely that people will defer to 
them. Consequently, so long as we can agree that there are some conditions—
whatever they may be—under which we should defer, what follows will constitute a 
worthwhile contribution, since it tells us something about what we can do to promote 
deference where deference is deserved. In that respect, the above assumption about 
when we should defer is modular, as far as the purposes of the present paper are con-
cerned. Consequently, in what follows, anyone finding the idea that someone know-
ing what they are talking about is a sufficient condition for us deferring to that some-
one altogether implausible should feel free to substitute their favored sufficient condi-
tion for any subsequent instance of the condition suggested above. 
Having said something about what constitutes deference, we may now turn to the 
type of context of deference that will concern us in what follows. The relevant context 
involves educators providing intellectual advice about how to avoid bias, and it—in 
line with the assumption just discussed—being the case that students should defer on 
account of the educators knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing 
sound advice. Providing such advice involves providing a request together with a 
suggestion for how to go about one’s epistemic business, a suggestion that’s sound in 
so far as it’s a good one. For example, in light of the statistician’s law of large num-
bers, an educator might say: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe that the features of a small 
sample will tell you anything about the features of the population from which it’s 
drawn.’ When students heed the request and listen to the educator, they can be said to 
be complying with that request. 
However, students complying with educators’ requests to be listened to does not 
necessarily make for deference. This is because students might comply with such re-
quests, but nevertheless fail to believe what they are being told. Given doxastic invol-
untarism, believing is not something that we do, so much as something that happens 
to us. For that reason, while we can be made to listen—more specifically, we can be 
made to attend (since an act) and trust that the automatic processing of content that 
                                                                                                                                           
should be doing, given our epistemic goal, whether or not it is always going to be transparent from a 
first-person point of view. 
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follows upon attending thus will occur—we cannot be made to believe. Consequently, 
when thinking about the relationship between compliance and deference, we should 
focus on how to increase the chances that students will defer to (i.e., listen to and be-
lieve) educators providing sound intellectual advice.
16
 Moreover, as for how to in-
crease the chances thus, I will make two empirical assumptions: 
First, getting someone to listen is conducive to getting that someone to believe 
what is being said. This assumption is compatible with people sometimes failing to 
believe what they are being told, as long as getting people to listen still serves to in-
crease the chances that they will believe what they are being told. Indeed, if we did 
not make that assumption, it would be hard to make sense of the great majority of per-
suasive practices, such as those involving advertisement, political campaigns, and 
public service announcements, that are geared exactly towards getting our attention. 
So, the relevant empirical assumption is this: while we cannot be made to believe 
things, we can be made to listen, and trust that there is an imperfect but still robust 
enough connection between us listening and us believing the content of what we hear 
for listening to increase the chances of belief.
17
 
Second, convincing someone to hold certain normative beliefs in particular (i.e., 
beliefs about what one should or should not believe, assume, and so forth) provides us 
with a way to indirectly regulate their belief-formation. This is so because believing 
that one should believe in a certain manner is conducive to actually believing in that 
manner. That is not to say that the former entails the latter, of course. For example, in 
some cases, I will not realize that I am making an inference from what is, in fact, a 
very small sample. In other cases, I might realize that, but suffer from an epistemic 
form of weak will (assuming that there is such a thing). Still, if we assume that my 
normative beliefs about how beliefs should be formed have some robust influence on 
what beliefs I do form, there will be a positive relationship between what I believe 
that I should believe, and what I will believe. Indeed, this assumption seems to be un-
                                                 
16
 When asking how we can increase the chances of deference, I am assuming that certain answers 
(e.g., ‘By putting a gun to their head’) are ruled out as impermissible on moral grounds or otherwise. 
17
 This empirical assumption is, of course, compatible with there being other things we can do, beside 
bringing people to listen, for purposes of increasing the chances of belief and, as such, of deference. 
For example, maybe there is some φ such that bringing people to listen and to φ would serve to in-
crease the chances of deference even further, compared to only bringing people to listen. Any such 
investigation would not only be compatible with, but also congenial to, the present investigation. 
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derlying large parts of what we do in educational settings, in so far as we try to teach 
students critical thinking skills.
18
 
Under these two empirical assumptions, promoting deference to educators 
providing sound intellectual advice involves as an important component promoting 
compliance with requests on the part of said educators to be listened to. Having made 
that clear, we are now in a position to formulate the problem educators encounter 
when attempting to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is not that there is 
no sound advice to be had. The problem is that, in a wide variety of cases where we 
should defer to others providing advice of the relevant kind, e.g., on account of them 
knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound intellectual advice, 
we fail to do so. As we shall see, one common reason that we fail to do so is that we 
tend to underestimate our tendencies for bias, and therefore fail to listen, let alone de-
fer. We may refer to this as the problem of intellectual deference. 
To grasp the nature and implications of this problem, we should understand it in 
the context of the well-established psychological fact that, depressed people aside,
19
 
most of us tend to rate ourselves as above average on desirable traits.
20
 The extent to 
which we deem ourselves to be more objective and less biased than others is no ex-
ception on this score. For example, using a variety of measures of objectivity, David 
Armor found that approximately 85 per cent of participants rated themselves as more 
objective than the average member of the group from which they were drawn.
21
 Simi-
larly, in a series of studies by Emily Pronin and colleagues, subjects rated themselves 
as less susceptible to each of a number of described biases compared both to the aver-
age American and to various peer groups.
22
 As Pronin notes in a recent overview on 
                                                 
18
 There does for present purposes not need to be a strong connection between one’s normative beliefs 
and one’s belief-formation. People who fail to believe what they are being told, or fail to have the rele-
vant normative beliefs guide their belief-formation, will be no worse off epistemically than they would 
have been, had they not come across the relevant source of intellectual advice. Consequently, any rela-
tion between listening and having one’s beliefs be regulated by the normative beliefs communicated—
even if not a strong one—will be for the better, epistemically speaking. That is, given such a relation, 
some will be epistemically better off, and no one will be epistemically worse off. When it comes to 
intellectual amelioration, we can do far worse than that. 
19
 See Taylor and Brown (1988). 
20
 See, for example, Alicke (1985) and Brown (1986). 
21
 See Armor (1999). 
22
 See Pronin et al. (2002). 
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what she terms our ‘bias blind spot’, the upshot of the data collected on the issue is 
that ‘people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human 
judgment—except when that bias is their own’.23 
The obvious problem is, of course, that we cannot all be above average. Conse-
quently, a significant proportion of us must be mistaken about our own relative insus-
ceptibility to bias, suggesting that the relevant self-other asymmetry reveals a tenden-
cy for overconfidence in the accuracy of our judgments. Indeed, the relevant kind of 
overconfidence has been independently revealed in calibration studies, investigating 
the extent to which our degrees of confidence tend to track our actual abilities. As it 
turns out, most of us are not very well-calibrated, in that we have a tendency to ex-
press a greater degree of confidence in our answers than is warranted by the extent to 
which we actually tend to get the relevant kind of questions right.
24
 This tendency can 
be found not only among lay people, but also among scientists, where the relevant 
bias takes the form of a tendency to underestimate the likelihood of errors.
25
 
In contexts of intellectual advice, the relevant blind spot manifests itself in the 
hearer thinking that she does not need to listen to intellectual advice, on account of 
her (perceived) relative insusceptibility to bias. Having such a blind spot is compati-
ble with acknowledging that most people are susceptible to bias, and as such are in 
need of intellectual advice. Indeed, the individual might even acknowledge that there 
are situations in which she herself could use some intellectual advice—just not in this 
case. However, in thinking herself unique, she will be just like the rest of us. Indeed, 
owing to the prevalence of bias blind spots, most people tend to think that they are not 
in need of intellectual advice, and that either they or their situation in that respect is 
unique. Factoring in that most people in a significant number of cases actually do suf-
fer from cognitive bias, we get the problem of intellectual deference: in a wide variety 
of cases where we should defer to others on matters intellectual, we nevertheless fail 
to do so on account of failing to listen. 
 
                                                 
23
 Pronin (2007: 37). 
24
 See, for example, Fischhoff et al. (1977). 
25
 See Henrion and Fischhoff (1986). 
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3. Removing Our Bias Blind Spots 
The previous section introduced the problem of intellectual deference, i.e., the prob-
lem that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others on intellectual 
matters, we nevertheless fail to do so. We also saw that one common reason that we 
fail to defer is that we fail to listen on account of overconfidence, listening being nec-
essary for deference. What can be done about this? 
Return to the kind of intellectual advice that has concerned us in the above, such 
as that involved when an educator tells her students: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe 
that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the features of the 
population from which it’s drawn.’ The problem discussed in the previous section 
arises when students fail to listen to the relevant advice on account of overconfidence. 
That is, since overconfident, they don’t think they need to listen to intellectual advice 
of this sort (or, indeed, possibly of any sort). 
To address this problem, the educator clearly needs to do more than simply pro-
vide the relevant piece of advice, together with a request to be listened to, since that 
request is likely to go unheeded on account of overconfidence. What else does she 
need to do, in order to get her students to listen? 
Maybe the educator can also ask her students to be on the lookout for cognitive 
biases. That is, maybe she can try to come to terms with the problem posed by our 
tendencies for overconfidence by urging some form of critical self-reflection on the 
part of her students. The problem with doing that, however, is that critically evaluat-
ing oneself for bias, for purposes of correcting any biases uncovered, is exactly what 
we can not expect someone with a bias blind spot to do. Owing to that blind spot, we 
will typically see no reason to reflect critically on the matter.
26
 Much like in the case 
of the original advice regarding the relation between features of samples and the pop-
ulations from which they are drawn, students (like the rest of us) are likely not to see 
any reason to listen, let alone to engage in critical self-reflection. In other words, the 
problem with invoking a notion of such self-reflection in an attempt to solve the prob-
lem of intellectual deference is that it is part of the very problem of people not defer-
ring that they will tend not to see the point of reflecting critically on the relevant mat-
ter. 
                                                 
26
 I discuss problems with self-reflection approaches to bias identification and correction at greater 
length in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013b). 
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For that reason, the way to come to terms with our bias blind spots is not by in-
sisting that we be self-reflective, but by having us take part in externally imposed ed-
ucational programs, informing us of the limits of our introspective abilities when it 
comes to identifying bias. That, at least, is the suggestion coming out of Pronin and 
Matthew Kugler’s results to the effect that our bias blind spot is a result of our ten-
dency to rely on introspective information when determining whether or not we are 
subject to bias.
27
 Since the processes that give rise to bias typically operate on a sub-
personal level, outside the scope of our introspective gaze, our search tends to come 
up empty. From the fact that our search comes up empty, we then infer an absence of 
bias—despite the fact that such a search is more or less guaranteed to come up empty, 
given the inaccessibility of the bulk of the relevant operations. However, Pronin and 
Kugler also found that subjects who, prior to evaluating the extent to which they were 
susceptible to a variety of biases, were asked to read a paper highlighting the intro-
spective inaccessibility of large parts of our mental lives, showed less of a tendency to 
claim that they were less susceptible to bias than their peers. 
This, however, is not to suggest that we have thereby solved the problem of intel-
lectual deference. There are two steps that need to be taken in order to solve that prob-
lem: one negative and one positive. As for the negative step, we need to counteract 
our bias blind spot, and thereby remove a prevalent obstacle to us listening to the rel-
evant sources. Understanding that step in terms of excessive reliance on introspective 
information, along the lines of Pronin and Kugler’s findings, what we need to do is 
bring people to the point of not relying so heavily on information they can (or rather: 
think they can) uncover by looking inwards. Moreover, doing so might serve to ad-
dress a subset of the problematic cases, namely those involving subjects who already 
believe what they are being told—e.g., that one should not assume that the features of 
a small sample tells one anything about the features of the population from which it is 
drawn—but simply fail to have the relevant (normative) beliefs impact their belief-
formation, on account of considering themselves to be relatively unsusceptible to the 
relevant set of biases due to their bias blind spots. 
But two kinds of cases remain that, moreover, are likely to make up the majority 
of the problematic cases: cases wherein people either have no (normative) beliefs on 
the matter—about statistical sampling or otherwise—and cases wherein the people 
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involved hold beliefs that run contrary to the recommendations provided by the 
sources of intellectual advice.
28
 In these cases, simply removing the relevant bias 
blind spot is not enough. The reason is that losing a motivation not to listen is not to 
gain a motivation to listen—let alone to listen to the people we should—which brings 
us to the second, positive step: In addition to having people not rely so heavily on in-
trospective information, we need to bring people to do something, namely to look 
outwards, and listen to the sources providing sound intellectual advice. Only then can 
we hope to instill or revise the relevant beliefs in the subjects. So, how can people be 
brought to listen, under the assumption that listening is conducive to believing and, as 
such, to deferring? This is the question that will concern us in the remainder of the 
paper. 
 
4. People Listen to People Who Listen 
The previous section noted that we might be able to remove our bias blind spots by 
becoming educated about the limits of introspection, but also that we have not thereby 
solved the problem of intellectual deference. The reason is that removing an obstacle 
to being motivated to listen is not to provide a motivation for listening, let alone for 
listening to the people we should be deferring to, e.g., on account of them providing 
sound intellectual advice. So how can we motivate people to listen to and, ultimately, 
defer to sources that they should be deferring to? In this section, it will be argued that 
the answer lies in a notion of procedural justice. In the next section, the relevant no-
tion will be related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic jus-
tice.
29
 
The idea behind the notion of procedural justice to be developed builds on an ob-
servation made above (in Section 2), to the effect that what sources of intellectual 
guidance are doing is providing a request, together with a piece of intellectual ad-
vice.
30
 The request is for people to listen to them, while the advice will consist in 
                                                 
28
 After all, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) famously suggested that people’s intuitions about random 
sampling ‘appear to satisfy the law of small numbers, which asserts that the law of large numbers ap-
plies to small numbers as well’ (25). 
29
 See Fricker (2007) and Coady (2010), respectively. 
30
 This should not be taken to imply that intellectual guidance, thus understood, exhausts the domain of 
epistemically ameliorative interventions. For example, certain biases will be best dealt with, not by 
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some concrete and constructive suggestion for how to go about one’s epistemic busi-
ness. To use the example from earlier, an educator might say ‘Listen, you shouldn’t 
assume that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the population 
from which it’s drawn’. Assuming that the hearer has been informed about the limits 
of introspection for the purpose of ridding her of her bias blind spot, as per the nega-
tive step discussed in the previous section, we can assume her to be open to the idea 
that the advice is relevant to her, and as such not be opposed to listening. Moreover, if 
the hearer heeds the request and listens, and the two empirical assumptions discussed 
above hold—i.e., there is a robust enough connection between listening and believing 
what is being said, and believing that one should believe in a certain manner is con-
ducive to actually believing in that manner—listening will increase the chances that 
the subject will not only defer but also form beliefs accordingly. 
This brings us to what will be argued in this section and the next: There is a kind 
of procedural justice that, if practiced by providers of intellectual advice, will increase 
the extent to which they are consulted on the relevant matter, as well as the rate of 
compliance with their requests for hearers to listen to them—which, under the afore-
mentioned assumptions, in turn will be correlated with hearers believing what they are 
being told, and forming beliefs accordingly. The hypothesis is that by providing intel-
lectual advice in a procedurally just manner, providers of such advice increase their 
chances of being perceived by us as just, which in turn can be expected to increase the 
extent to which we will consult them, as well as the rate at which we will comply with 
their requests for being listened to. 
What is the content of the relevant notion of procedural justice? And why consid-
er this hypothesis at all plausible? The first question is best answered by way of the 
second. The main source of support for the hypothesis comes from Tom Tyler and 
colleagues’ research into why people follow the law. On a traditional picture, people 
follow the law because of a fear of sanctions. However, in a landmark study, Tyler 
showed that fear of sanctions is not the only or even the most important factor behind 
why people follow the law; an equally if not more important factor is people consider-
ing the relevant authorities legitimate.
31
 To be legitimate is to be deserving of defer-
                                                                                                                                           
providing advice to individual agents, but by a social practice of exposure control (see Ahlstrom-Vij, 
2013c). 
31
 See Tyler (2006a). 
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ence, and to be perceived as legitimate is to be perceived as being thus deserving. 
Consequently, perceived legitimacy is a property that, ‘when it is possessed, leads 
people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social arrangements’.32 More spe-
cifically, as perceived legitimacy goes up, so does compliance.
33
  
Moreover, the central factor determining whether people conceive of an authority 
as legitimate is the extent to which they perceive that authority to be procedurally just, 
which brings us back to the first question above: What is the content of the relevant 
notion of procedural justice? The notion can be defined in terms of four components: 
The first component pertains to being provided with an opportunity to state one’s 
case. Let us refer to this condition as input. According to Tyler, ‘[p]eople have a tre-
mendous desire to present their side of the story and value the opportunity in and of 
itself’.34 As such, being given an opportunity to state one’s case has a significant posi-
tive effect on perceived justice—i.e., on people taking someone to be just, in the sense 
we’re in the process of spelling out—even when we feel that we have no influence 
over the authority’s actual decision on the matter (e.g., about whether we are to be 
fined, sentenced, and so forth.).
35
  
The second component of justice is the hearer evaluating one’s input in a way 
that is sensitive only to the facts of the matter, not to the hearer’s personal preferences 
or prejudices. Let us refer to this as factuality.  
The third component corresponds to the fact that, while people do not require that 
their input be reflected in the ultimate decision, they must be able to infer that what 
has been said at the very least has been considered.
36
 Let us refer to this condition as 
consideration. As discussed by Tyler, the relevant condition is fairly weak: in many 
cases, simply explaining that the input was considered but, unfortunately, could not 
influence the decision is sufficient for satisfying the consideration condition.  
The fourth and final component of justice involves the authorities making an ef-
fort to satisfy the above conditions, as opposed to simply going through the motions. 
Let us refer to this component as effort.  
                                                 
32
 Tyler (2006b: 376). 
33
 See Tyler (2006a: 57). 
34
 Tyler (2006a: 147). 
35
 Tyler (2006a: 127). 
36
 See Tyler (2006a: 149). 
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If people feel that they have been treated in a procedurally just manner—i.e., if 
they feel that the input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions have been sat-
isfied—they perceive the relevant authority to be just, which in turn has them consid-
er the authority more legitimate, as well as increases their compliance with the laws 
laid down by that authority. In fact, perceptions of justice can give rise to a feedback 
loop, in that, when authorities are viewed as legitimate, their actions are more likely 
to be seen as being just.
37, 38
 
The following are two extensions of these results that are relevant to our investi-
gation: 
First, the relationship between perceived procedural justice—i.e., the perceived 
satisfaction of the four conditions just outlined—perceived legitimacy, and compli-
ance is not unique to the legal domain; it applies to rule-following more generally. For 
example, employee perceptions regarding the justice of corporate policies, and the 
resulting perception of the legitimacy of their employers, tracks employee compliance 
with corporate policies,
39
 as well as cooperative behavior more generally, including 
compliance with rules in the absence of explicit requests for compliance or threats of 
sanctions.
40
 The same goes for non-corporate employees, such as police officers and 
members of the military, who, too, are significantly more inclined to comply with at-
                                                 
37
 See Tyler (2006a: 107). 
38
 In some places (e.g., in Blader and Tyler 2003), Tyler talks about a four-component model of proce-
dural justice. In those contexts, the components correspond to the dimensions along which people eval-
uate procedural justice, namely with respect to decision-making, quality of treatment, formal interac-
tions, and informal interactions. By contrast, the four components discussed here pertain to what Tyler 
and colleagues’ research suggests constitutes the content of justice evaluations, in the sense of what we 
look for when evaluating people’s behavior or the structure of organizations, along aforementioned 
dimensions or otherwise. 
39
 See Tyler and Blader (2005). 
40
 See Tyler (2011: Chapter 3). To avoid confusion, I have ignored a possible terminological shift be-
tween Tyler’s earlier (e.g., his 2006a) and his more recent work (e.g., his 2011). In the former, what I 
have referred to as the input and consideration conditions are conditions on perceived procedural jus-
tice; in the latter, these are occasionally (e.g., 2011: 106) but not consistently (e.g., 2011: 114) treated 
as conditions on perceived trustworthiness, where the latter is treated as a separate contributory factor 
to perceived legitimacy, in addition to that of perceived procedural justice (see, e.g., his 2011: 112). 
Since this terminological shift makes no substantive difference, I will stick to Tyler’s earlier terminol-
ogy, and take perceived trustworthiness—if that’s the term we should use for what’s captured by input 
and consideration—to be a component of perceived procedural justice. 
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tempts to regulate their performance in so far as they deem their employers to be just, 
and thereby legitimate.
41
 
Second, perceived procedural justice is not just relevant to our tendency to com-
ply with communicated rules or norms—i.e., doing what we are being told to do—but 
also to our willingness to engage in consultation, i.e., seeking advice on what is to be 
done in the first place. For example, on the question of whom to consult, people report 
being more prone to consult professionals regarding retirement saving and investment 
strategies who they perceive to be just than professionals who they do not perceive to 
be just, even when aware that the cost of receiving a just treatment would be a de-
creased likelihood of financial gain.
42
 Moreover, as for the question of whether to 
consult someone, students report being more likely to seek advice from their profes-
sors on academic as well as on personal matters, when they take the professors to be 
such that they would treat them in a just manner.
43
 
In other words, within a wide variety of domains, we have reason to believe that 
people are significantly more inclined, not simply to consult others in the first place, 
but also to comply with requests or recommendations provided in consultations, when 
those consulted are perceived to be just. In other words, the causal relationship be-
tween the relevant components can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Perceived  
Procedural Justice 
(i.e., perceived satisfaction of input, 
factuality, effort and consideration) 
 → 
Perceived  
Legitimacy 
→ 
Consultation 
          + 
 Compliance 
 
Indeed, the robustness of the relationship between perceived justice and compliance 
as well as consultation suggests that it can be invoked in order to come to terms with 
compliance problems generally. That is the motivation for the present hypothesis, to 
the effect that there is a form of procedural justice that, if practiced by sources provid-
ing intellectual advice, can be expected to increase the extent to which their requests 
to be listened to are being heeded in virtue of the effect of perceived justice on com-
pliance and consultation rates. More specifically, applying the four conditions on pro-
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42
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cedural justice identified above—i.e., input, factuality, effort, and consideration—the 
relevant sources can both increase consultation rates and promote compliance with 
their requests for being listened to by making sure that they (a) provide people with 
an opportunity for input on the relevant matters, (b) evaluate such input in a factual 
manner, (c) offer an explanation in cases where that input, after having been consid-
ered, cannot influence their advice, and (d) make an effort to do what it takes to satis-
fy the input, factuality, and consideration conditions. 
If we were to formulate a slogan capturing what sources need to do in order to get 
us to defer—assuming, as above, that listening is to a robust enough extent conducive 
to believing what one is being told—it would be this: people listen to people who lis-
ten. In formulating the slogan thus, I am making an assumption about the relationship 
between perceived justice and de facto justice, to the effect that the best way to seem 
just is to be just. If that assumption holds, we may rewrite the graph above as follows: 
 
Procedural  
Justice     
→ 
Perceived  
Procedural 
Justice 
→ 
Perceived  
Legitimacy 
→ 
Consultation 
          + 
 Compliance 
 
Assuming such a relationship between perceived and de facto procedural justice is not 
to deny that it is conceptually possible to solve compliance problems by simply seem-
ing to be just. It should be noted, however, that it is not only unlikely that one would 
be able to pull off the level of deception required in the long run, but also unclear 
what would be gained from it. After all, maintaining the relevant deception for the 
purposes of merely seeming just would most likely require an equal if not greater 
amount of resources than would simply being just. In other words, the best way to 
have people perceive sources of intellectual advice to be just is for those sources to 
make a sincere effort to provide a forum for input, and taking into account what is be-
ing said in a factual manner, where the relevant consideration involves also explaining 
why the input does not change the advice given in cases where it does not. 
Naturally, focusing on what sources providing sound intellectual advice can do to 
promote consultation and compliance by way of procedural justice, in the manner that 
we have done so far, might raise worries about epistemic sources that we should not 
defer to—e.g., because they do not know what they’re talking about, nor satisfy any 
other sufficient condition relevant to whom we should be deferring to—nevertheless 
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being able to practice procedural justice and, thereby, bring about consultation and 
deference. This worry speaks to the observation that bringing people to defer to the 
sources of intellectual advice they should be deferring to is really only half the prob-
lem of intellectual deference. The other half is that of also bringing people not to de-
fer to sources of intellectual advice to which they should not defer.  
Notice, however, that the two halves of the problem are not independent of one 
another. In particular, the more successful we are with respect to solving the first half 
of the problem—i.e., that of bringing people to defer to the sources they should defer 
to, e.g., on account of those sources providing sound intellectual advice, or satisfying 
some other sufficient condition on obligated intellectual deference—the more suc-
cessful we will be with respect to the second half of the problem. This is so under the 
assumption that there is a practical limit to how many sources any given person can 
defer to. Given such a limit, increased success in bringing people to defer to the 
sources they should defer to will, in effect, also serve the goal of bringing people to 
defer only to those sources. 
 
5. Varieties of Epistemic Justice 
As should be clear from the previous sections, the relevant kind of procedural justice 
would be practiced, not by those on the receiving end of intellectual advice, but by the 
sources of advice themselves. We might say that it is a speaker-centered form of jus-
tice.
44
 As such, it might be contrasted with the notion of epistemic justice presented 
by Miranda Fricker, and with her notion of testimonial justice in particular.
45
 Frick-
er’s notion of testimonial justice captures, we might say, a hearer-centered form of 
justice. More specifically, it is a hearer-centered anti-prejudicial form of justice 
achieved through critical self-reflection. Prejudice consists in an epistemically culpa-
ble resistance to evidence for a speaker’s trustworthiness, sometimes combined with a 
negative and ethically culpable affective investment on the part of the hearer. The rel-
evant kind of justice involves the hearer ‘shift[ing] intellectual gear out of spontane-
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ous, unreflective mode and into active critical reflection in order to identify how far 
[a] suspected prejudice has influenced her judgment’.46 
That said, the distinction between hearer- and speaker-centered forms of justice 
does not get to an essential difference between Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice 
and the notion of procedural justice developed here. After all, there is nothing that 
prevents speakers from manifesting Fricker’s anti-prejudicial virtue of testimonial 
justice, for example in deciding whom to address. The real difference between Frick-
er’s notion and the procedural notion relevant in contexts of intellectual deference is 
that the former pertains specifically to prejudice, while the latter does not. More spe-
cifically, as Fricker understands testimonial justice, it guarantees that one is not prej-
udiced in one’s evaluations of people’s trustworthiness. As such, testimonial justice 
might go some lengths towards helping us satisfy the factuality condition, but not 
necessarily towards satisfying the remaining three conditions provided in the previous 
section. The reason is this:  
Those in most need of intellectual advice might be least worthy of one’s ear, from 
an epistemic perspective. Moreover, someone who refuses to listen to someone who 
has nothing epistemically relevant to say is not thereby prejudiced. Still, if the above 
is on the right track, and one way to promote deference is to listen to people in the 
manner outlined in the previous section, we might in some contexts—including those 
that involve providing intellectual advice in educational settings—need to listen to 
                                                 
46
 Fricker (2007: 91). Fricker refers to this as the corrective form of testimonial justice. She wants to 
also leave room for a naïve manifestation of testimonial justice (93). She discusses two kinds of naïve 
manifestation: first, someone who simply happens to lack the relevant prejudices, while possessing a 
general motivation to make unprejudiced credibility judgments; and, second, someone who has preju-
diced beliefs that for whatever reason fail to influence her credibility judgments in testimonial interac-
tions. It is not clear, however, that these two kinds of cases should be categorized as instances of testi-
monial justice, naïve or not. According to Fricker, the virtue of testimonial justice ‘requires the hearer 
to reliably neutralize prejudice in her judgments of credibility’ (92). Since a person may be free of 
prejudice and possess a motivation to remain unprejudiced, while lacking an ability to reliably neutral-
ize prejudice, had she been subject to any, it is not clear that the first kind of case should be taken to 
involve testimonial justice. Moreover, since a person’s prejudiced beliefs might fail to corrupt her cred-
ibility judgments without it being the case that, had her beliefs in fact corrupted her judgments, she 
would have been able to reliably neutralize the corrupting influence, it also is not clear that the second 
kind of case should qualify as involving testimonial justice. Hence, my focus on the corrective form of 
testimonial justice, which in light of the above seems to be the form that is most in line with what 
Fricker herself takes testimonial justice to consist in. 
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people who actually have nothing to say. Doing that, however, is not something that 
the testimonially just person needs to be doing. A testimonially just person listens in 
an unprejudiced manner, but is not required to listen to anyone in particular, let alone 
to people who have nothing relevant to say. 
It should be stressed that this is not a critique of Fricker’s notion of testimonial 
justice. The question of what to do in light of the fact that people’s evaluations of oth-
er’s credibility sometimes are colored by prejudice—including prejudice pertaining to 
race, sexuality, and gender—is very different from the question of what to do in the 
face of the problem of intellectual deference. For that reason, what has been argued so 
far should not be taken to suggest that Fricker’s notion cannot do what she wants it to 
do, namely address problems arising on account of prejudice, and centrally negative 
identity prejudice. Nor is it being suggested that the notion of procedural justice de-
veloped here can replace Fricker’s. For example, it would be downright insulting to 
suggest that what a hearer subject to prejudicial treatment on account of her race 
should be doing is spend more time listening to her racist interlocutors.
47
 
Instead, the only thing suggested is this: Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice 
cannot do what needs to be done in relation to the problem of intellectual deference. 
Hence, the need for a different notion of justice in testimonial contexts, and in testi-
monial contexts involving the provision of intellectual advice in particular, in addition 
to (not instead of) that provided by Fricker through her notion of testimonial justice. 
Exercising the relevant kind of procedural justice involves listening without epistemic 
discrimination, in the specific sense of listening without any regard for the epistemic 
merits of what is being said, and then explaining why what is being said has no bear-
ing on the correct intellectual recommendation, in cases where it does not. By listen-
ing without discrimination in this manner, we are making an effort—hopefully per-
ceived by the agent as such—to make any given person feel that they are provided 
with an opportunity for input. By moreover evaluating that input in a manner only 
sensitive to the facts, and explaining why that input cannot be taken to alter the ver-
dict on what is the right intellectual recommendation in the relevant case, we are also 
trying to make people feel that their views are still given consideration in a factual 
manner, whether or not those views factor into the relevant recommendation. 
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At this point, it might be objected that there is something impracticable about the 
relevant kind of procedural justice, since it seems to require that we listen to absolute-
ly everyone. How could we possibly hope to do so?
48
 The answer is of course that, in 
the great majority of cases, we cannot, but that practicing procedural justice also does 
not require us to do so. Such justice is compatible with putting constraints on whom 
one listens to, including constraints motivated by practical considerations. What is 
central to the kind of procedural justice relevant here is simply that we do not impose 
any epistemic constraints, as in constraints motivated by the epistemic merits of what 
is being said. 
The point that there might be several notions of justice relevant in epistemic con-
texts is in line with a recent suggestion by David Coady.
49
 Coady argues that, in addi-
tion to Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice, which as we have seen highlights unjust 
credibility deficits, we need to acknowledge that there also are epistemic injustices 
pertaining to the distribution of epistemic goods. The latter kind of injustice occurs 
‘when someone’s right to know is violated’.50 Coady explains: 
 
[…] a person can have their right to know something violated in two distinguish-
able ways. They can be unjustly put (or left) in a position in which they are igno-
rant of something that they are entitled to know, or they can be unjustly put (or 
left) in a position in which they are wrong about something they are entitled to be 
right about. There seems no reason to think that either of these is inherently more 
of an injustice than the other (Coady 2010: 109). 
 
Clearly, Coady’s distributive notion of epistemic justice is different from the proce-
dural notion of justice that has been defended in the above. Moreover, there is no rea-
son to believe that the two are in conflict with one another. To the contrary, the notion 
defended here complements Coady’s rather nicely. We started out our investigation 
by thinking about how to instill epistemic virtues in students, for purposes of enabling 
them to attain knowledge, and found that we might be able to facilitate such attain-
ments through a notion of procedural justice, given the prevalence of cognitive bias as 
                                                 
48
 I'm grateful to Miranda Fricker for raising this question. 
49
 See Coady (2010). 
50
 Coady (2010: 105). 
Forthcoming in Episteme. 
Please quote from the published version, if possible. 
 23 
an obstacle to virtue. For that reason, the notion of procedural justice developed above 
can serve as a means to correcting exactly the kind of epistemic injustices that Coady 
is calling our attention to, by ridding those concerned of bias, paving the way for epis-
temic virtue, and thereby also reducing ignorance and correcting errors, including in 
cases of unjust ignorance and error.  
To sum up, the notion of procedural justice defended here is distinct from but in 
no way in conflict with the notions of epistemic justice defended by Fricker and Co-
ady.
51
 In fact, the relevant notion of procedural justice can be utilized for purposes of 
mitigating cases of epistemic justice, at least as understood by Coady. However, that 
in itself does not go to show that the former notion will not prove problematic on 
some other ground. Let us consider some possible objections. 
 
6. Objections 
First, it might be objected that the legal cases at the heart of the research on the role of 
procedural justice and deference are simply too different from the cases that concern 
us in so far as we are worrying about the problem of intellectual deference. More spe-
cifically, return to one of the three problematic cases discussed at the end of Section 
3, wherein a subject holds beliefs that run contrary to the recommendation provided 
by the source of intellectual advice, and thereby disagrees with the source. In light of 
this kind of case, someone might highlight the following disanalogy with the legal 
case: you can go along with a law you do not agree with (e.g., because you do not 
want to face sanctions, or because you consider the law-giver legitimate), but since 
belief-formation is not open to voluntary control, you cannot believe a recommenda-
tion you do not believe in, no matter how severe the sanctions or how legitimate you 
consider the source of the recommendation. 
Clearly, there is such a disanalogy, but does it present a problem for the present 
suggestion that we may solve the problem of intellectual deference with reference to a 
notion of procedural justice? It does not. The reason is that the relevant analogy is not 
between believing and following the law, but between listening and following the law. 
Moreover, here is something we can certainly do: we can listen to a source of intellec-
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tual advice, even if we don’t agree with what she’s saying. Why is that significant? If 
what I have suggested is on point, being brought to listen will increase the chances of 
belief (or, in this case: belief-change), and as such of deference. Hence, the main 
question of this paper: How can people be brought to listen? Since people listen to 
people who listen, sources will listen for purposes of in turn having people listen to 
them. As noted several times already, listening does not guarantee believing what one 
is being told, particularly not in the face of belief to the contrary. Rather, in accord-
ance with what is taken for granted by any practice involving attempts to bring people 
to believe things—even in cases where the people involved believe the opposite—we 
are merely trying to increase the chances of belief or belief-change, and assume that 
bringing people to listen stands a good chance of doing exactly that. 
Let us consider a second objection. The claims made here about procedural jus-
tice are both empirical and conceptual in nature. The empirical claim is that sources 
satisfying the input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions increase the 
chances that people will consult as well as listen to them. The conceptual claim is that 
those conditions capture a notion of procedural justice. Someone might object that the 
preceding sections do not give us sufficient reason to talk of the conditions identified 
as capturing a form of procedural justice. To such a person it might be worth it to 
point out that what ultimately matters for purposes of this paper is that there are cer-
tain conditions that, if satisfied, help us solve the problem of intellectual deference, in 
accordance with the above empirical claim. I find it helpful to refer to the joint satis-
faction of those conditions as procedural justice, particularly given their roots in Ty-
ler’s research as well as their place in the larger matrix of epistemically relevant no-
tions of justice discussed in the previous section. That said, I am not particularly in-
terested in conceptual legislation. 
A third objection is this: it has been suggested that providers of sound intellectual 
advice should listen without epistemic discrimination, including to those who might 
be gravely mistaken and as such have nothing to say, in order to bring about consulta-
tion and compliance. Moreover, an empirical assumption was made about the relation 
between compliance and deference, to the effect that listening to someone is condu-
cive to believing what one is being told. But given that assumption, there is a danger 
that those made to listen without discrimination, for purposes of practicing the rele-
vant kind of procedural justice, might actually start believing what they are being told 
by people who are gravely mistaken—or so the objection goes. 
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In response, it should be noted that, if there’s anything that’s likely to block the 
route from listening to deference it’s the ability of the informed to see that those who 
are gravely mistaken are just that. Indeed, were it not the case that the informed typi-
cally are able to do so, education would generally be a failure. However, education is 
not generally a failure, and to the extent that there are challenges associated with the 
epistemic asymmetry characterizing educator-student relationships, it seems safe to 
assume that those challenges rarely if ever stem from an inability of educators to lis-
ten to the gravely mistaken without becoming convinced that they are, in fact, in-
formed. In other words, while it is not strictly speaking impossible that the informed 
are in some cases misled by those gravely mistaken, it seems safe to assume that it is 
likely that the informed will tend not to defer, on account of being able to tell that the 
gravely mistaken are indeed just that. 
A fourth objection to what has been argued in the above is that there is something 
questionable, maybe even objectionable, about practicing the relevant kind of proce-
dural justice. Often, we listen to people because we are interested in hearing what 
they are saying, and not primarily for the purpose of having them listen to us in turn. 
If educators or other people in the business of providing sound intellectual advice lis-
ten to us primarily for purposes of having us listen to them, is there a sense in which 
they are using us? I am inclined to say ‘no’, the reason being this: while it would 
make sense to talk about people using us if the purpose of getting us to listen would 
be for them to gain something (think advertisement), the contexts that concern us here 
involve attempts to get us to listen for the purpose of benefitting us. If we can be 
brought to listen to sources providing sound intellectual advice, we are not being 
used—on the contrary, we are being helped. Specifically, we are being helped to be-
come better thinkers. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Educators have reason to instill epistemic virtues in students, on account of how epis-
temic virtues constitute dispositions conducive to epistemic goals, such as knowledge, 
which also happens to be the fundamental goal of education. Moreover, since cogni-
tive bias constitutes a common obstacle to such virtue, educators also have reason to 
teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is that it is a well-established fact that 
we often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing bias on account of us 
being overconfident about our intellectual abilities, and thereby underestimating our 
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susceptibility to bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper 
argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms 
with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators delivering 
their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant 
form of procedural justices were specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David 
Coady’s notions of testimonial justice. Finally, a series of objections were considered 
and responded to.
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